Recycling Archives

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was widely reported that the United States faced a solid waste crisis. Existing landfills were reaching capacity or being shut down because of more stringent regulations while waste volumes were continuing to rise. At the time, several market-oriented policy analysts advocated the adoption of variable rate charges for mixed refuse in conjunction with curbside pick-up of recyclables (without charge) as a means of reducing waste volumes and diverting recyclable material to more valuable uses. During the course of the past decade, such policies have been adopted widely throughout the United States - approximately 20 percent of the U.S. population now face variable rate charges for mixed refuse collection. Even more have curbside collection of recyclable materials. This article collects and reviews empirical studies evaluating the effects of variable rate pricing. It finds that these policies have been quite effective as a means of boosting diversion rates beyond the levels that can be achieved through curbside collection of recyclables alone. The overall cost-benefit analysis of such programs is modestly favorable. Since many states and communities have committed to achieving specified waste diversion targets, variable rate policies have been a cost effective policy tool. The experience with variable rate policies represents a promising example of non-coercive, information-oriented government intervention. With a relatively small budget and no authority to impose household solid waste policy on local governments, EPA has been remarkably successful at developing and diffusing effective solid waste management policies. The economic theory underlying variable rate pricing has proven, after some tinkering at the implementation stage, to be quite workable in practice. In fact, the practical realities of implementing charges have shown that theoretical perfection in terms of getting the prices right is less important in the grand scheme than keeping the transaction costs manageable. Looking forward, variable rate pricing can be expected to become even more economically advantageous as recycling markets continue to mature, landfill tipping fees rise, and improved technologies for curbside collection, monitoring, billing, and measuring waste develop.

The article discusses the problem of privately subsidized recycling schemes, that are common in the developed countries and that may in certain circumstances harm the environment of developing countries, as a result of the asymmetry in economic development and environmental protection between them and the developed countries where the products originate. This may happen, for instance, when such products are exported to developing countries and have a negative impact on the economic viability of collection and recycling of their own waste. Newly established and still struggling recycling plants, unsupported by private or governmental subsidies or other protective measures prevailing in the rich and more environmentally conscious countries, may be forced to close down. Alternatively, they may decide to abandon expensive collection of local waste, in favor of free or subsidized waste imported from developed countries. In both cases, collection and recycling activities in the importing countries are reduced, and sometimes eliminated. The objective of this article is to document and draw attention to this problem, that has not yet been discussed in the rich literature on trade & environment, and to examine the question of what remedies, if any, may be offered under international trade law (in particular GATT/WTO rules) to affected countries. Would countries in situations as those described above be permitted to take measures against imports harming their recycling activities? Of particular interest in this regard, is how to relate to privately paid, but governmentally induced, subsidies under the WTO Subsidies Agreement? Such subsidies, while fulfilling most economic definitions of subsidies, appear to have escaped the attention of the Agreement's drafters and may therefore be outside its scope. Importing member countries would therefore be precluded from taking countervailing measures against products enjoying such subsidies. These and other potential protective measures will be discussed in the article, in light of recent case law of the WTO, in particular in the matter of United States - Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies. This discussion will demonstrate the formalistic nature of the existing WTO jurisprudence and show how a more purposive, teleological approach to interpretation of international trade rules could lead to a better solution to the problem at hand.